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A BRIEF HISTORY OF AID IN
EAST AFRICA:T HE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVERGENCE
HOWARD STEIN*
The debate over the nature and impact of aid on the
economies and policy strategy of African countries
has been rancorous and protracted.A good detail of
the focus has been on empirical studies of the impact
of aid on economic growth including the role of
Washington consensus policies in enhancing or
reducing the effect of aid.1 Other studies have
looked less at the direct effects of aid and more at
the indirect effect of policy conditionality. Some
have argued that economic growth has done poorly
in Africa because orthodox policies were imple-
mented while others have purported to show the
very opposite.2 Still other have argued, based on
modeling of donor-government behavior that adjust-
ment was never implemented properly and that it
would have worked if properly followed.3 The focus
of this paper will be somewhat different.To test the
impact of aid on government policy, this short study
will focus on the levels of assistance over time and
the degree of policy convergence between three
countries in the same region of East Africa that
started from divergent policy positions. Instead of
abstract modeling of assumed behavior, the focus
will be on an historical account of the impact of
donor policies embedded in aid packages on the
shifting nature of government policy. In general, the
paper will argue that while there have been varia-
tions in relations between governments, internation-
al financial institutions (IFIs) and donors,aid and the
withholding of aid have been effective in breaking
down political resistance to orthodox reform and in
shaping East African economies in a neo-liberal
image.
ODA and Africa 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) general-
ly includes grants and concessional loans (with a
25-percent grant component calculated at a rate of
discount of 10 percent) from government and
other official sources for development/welfare
purposes. There are a number of approaches to
measuring ODA flows including gross measure-
ments, net nominal and real flows, ODA/GDP,
ODA/capital formation, ODA/exports and im-
ports, etc. All of these provide varying and useful
information.The best overall indicator is arguably
per capita ODA which takes into account the







































































































Source: World Bank (2009e).
ODA PER CAPITA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1960–2006
net ODA per capita in current US dollars
Figure 1 * University of Michigan,Ann Arbor.An
earlier version of this paper was present-
ed at the SIDA/CDPR Ownership Work-
shop, SOAS at the University of London,
25 January 2002. The revised version was
written as visiting fellow at KITLV (Royal
Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian
and Caribbean Studies), Leiden, the
Netherlands.
1 See, for example, the early debate on the
role of ‘good policies’ in aid where good
policies are defined by a standard array of
orthodox macrostabilization targets includ-
ing low inflation,openness of the economy,
budget surpluses, etc. Hansen and Tarp
(2001) were unable in their econometric
analysis to reproduce the results of the
World Bank work by Burnside and Dollar
(2000) which purported to illustrate that
aid was only effective in the presence of
these ‘good policies’. Since then there have
been dozens of empirical studies on aid and
its impact in growth. For a list of some of
these, see Mavrotos (2009).
2 See discussions of this literature in Stein
(2008).
3 See e.g. Killick (2004).lar terms. Figure 1 provides the general movement
of ODA in Africa since 1960.
We can see that there was a fairly significant rise in
the commitment of donors to Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) through 1992, stagnation until 1995 and then
a significant decline from 1995 to 2001,and a recov-
ery thereafter. Table 1 provides specific ODA per
capita figures for the period from 1985 to 2006 and
includes information for all three countries in East
Africa. We can see that aid peaked in 1990-92 at
around USD 33 per capita. However by 2000 aid
had dramatically collapsed to a tiny USD 18 per
capita or roughly a 45 percent decline. As we can
see, per capita aid did not surpass the level of the
early 1990s until 2005 and 2006.
There is a considerable literature venturing expla-
nations of the decline in the 1990s pointing to the
post-cold war period, donor fatigue, the growth of
conservative power with their anti-aid agenda, the
shifting of focus toward east and central Europe,
etc. While these general trends have had their
impact in East Africa, each country has also been
influenced by its own idiosyncrasies.For Kenya with
its very problematic bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions following many years of political turmoil, the
decline was precipitous in the 1990s and fell by
80 percent over the decade.In 2006,per capita assis-
tance reached only 50 percent of the peak year in
this country. In contrast, aid to Tanzania and
Uganda held up remarkably well. For Tanzania the
decline after the mid-1990s was roughly a third from
the peak years of the early 1990s. Uganda was a
comparative favorite of the international communi-
ty in the 1990s.The per capita ODA was almost con-
stant through the period of 1990-1997 and actually
had a peak year in 1995. Only the years 1998 and
1999 showed some fall-off in assistance which rapid-
ly recovered and surged after 2002. By 2006 per
capita aid in Uganda was almost 50 percent above
the levels of the early 1990s.
This brief paper is aimed at providing a narrative on
the recent pattern of ODA.The focus is on orthodox
reform or structural adjustment (macro-stabiliza-
tion, privatization and liberalization, etc.) which has
dominated the agenda in Africa in general and East
Africa in particular.Each country has had historical-
ly divergent strategies, politics and relations with
donors that have affected how the orthodox strategy
has been implemented.The focal point will be on the
post-1986 period. However, the paper will also
briefly discuss donor relations between 1980 and
1986 in Tanzania and Kenya.This is the year in which
Tanzania settled with the IMF. It is also the year in
which Museveni and the NRM came to power. It is
less consequential in Kenya but it is the year they
released the Sessional Paper No. 1 which launched
the second level of economic reform and was a reaf-
firmation of their commitment to reform.As we can
see in Table 1, 1986 and 1987 were threshold years
for all three governments with huge increases in
ODA. Let me begin with Tanzania.
Tanzania
Bagachwa et al. (1997) characterize aid flows to
Tanzania as having four phases: the aid expansion
phase when donors supported the country in the
wake of the Arusha Declaration (1967–1980); the
contraction phase (1980–1985) when Tanzania resist-
ed settling with the IMF/World Bank and failed with
its home-grown attempts at reform; the aid adjust-
ment phase that followed the accord with the World
Bank and the IMF; and the consolidation phase
when aid was more closely tied to performance cri-
teria which is a reflection of donor fatigue. I would
like to add a fifth phase, the MDG phase after 2001
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Table e 1 1 
ODA A per r capita a for r Sub-Saharan n Africa, , Tanzania, , Uganda a and d Kenya a 
1985–2006 6 (in n current t US S dollar) 
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
SSA 19 23 25 28 29 33 32 33 30 31 30 
Tanzania 22 29 39 42 37 46 41 49 34 33 29 
Uganda  12 12 19 24 26 37 36 38 31 37 39 
Kenya  22 22 26 38 47 50 38 35 35 25 27 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SSA 25 22 21 19 18 19 25 31 32 40 49 
Tanzania 28 30 31 30 30 36 35 47 47 38 46 
Uganda  31 36 28 25 33 31 27 36 43 41 52 
Kenya  21 15 14 10 16 14 12 15 19 22 26 
Source: Worls Bank (2009e).CESifo Forum 4/2009 15
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in which donors committed to raise their ODA lev-
els to help reach the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG).
Figure 2 and Table 1 above tend to confirm the im-
portance of 1986 in terms of the direction and level
of aid. Overall (bilateral and multilateral aid) fell by
roughly a third during the period of 1981 to 1985.
The decrease also included significant declines in
countries that were the strongest supporters of
Tanzania historically, including Sweden.
The breakdown in negotiations with the IMF and the
growing cartel-like behavior of bilateral and multi-
lateral organizations in their support of adjustment
was a clear cause of this decline. In 1980 Tanzania
signed a three-year standby agreement for SDR 195
million, including a SDR 15 million compensatory
facility.The accord had the usual IMF conditionality
associated with it such as credit ceilings on govern-
ment borrowing, reduction of external commercial
arrears, and studies to evaluate mechanisms to raise
interest rates and alter the foreign exchange levels
and regime.Due largely to the huge increase in mar-
keting board credit needs, the ceiling on borrowing
was greatly exceeded leading to a suspension of the
agreement in November 1980. Negotiations contin-
ued through 1981. In September, the IMF submitted
a memorandum including a 50 to 60 percent devalu-
ation, with adjustments to reflect inflation rate
changes, significant deficit reductions, the elimina-
tion of subsidies on many products including a
tripling of the price of sembe (maize meal) in order
to diminish government support of the parastatals,
removal of interest rate subsidization and an in-
crease to real positive levels, and improving farm
incentives by raising producer
prices by 75 to 80 percent,imple-
menting cost-of-living adjust-
ments, the removal of import
controls on inputs leading to
input price liberalization and
implementing a single licensing
system.
The package was rejected by the
government with negotiations
lapsing for seven months. In
response to the failure to reach a
new accord, in May 1981 the
government launched a home-
grown program aimed at mobi-
lizing internal resources for
export and food self-sufficiency. The National
Economic Survival Program (NESP) was hastily
conceived and completely ineffective. Its poor for-
mulation and weak implementation enfeebled the
credibility of individuals within the state pushing
alternatives to the IMF.4 In late 1981, the Tanzania
Advisory Group was jointly formed by the govern-
ment of Tanzania and the World Bank with a techni-
cal assistance credit from the International De-
velopment Association (IDA). It included well-
known Tanzania experts like Brian van Arkadie,
Cran Pratt, Gerry Helleiner and John Loxley. They
formulated the Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP) prepared on the premise of reaching agree-
ment with the IMF. Much of it focused on measures
to tighten government budgeting. It was the begin-
ning of the movement toward meeting the
September 1981 IMF memorandum.
The National Agricultural Policy, also launched in
the fall of 1982, pushed the country toward the IMF
conditionality.While it still supported producer sub-
sidies, along the IMF lines the report called for
devaluation, cost of living increases for producers
and the removal of consumer subsidies. The Tan-
zanian economy continued to decline through the
early 1980s. As donors began to withdraw their
ODA,the international accounts badly deteriorated.
Exports fell by 30 percent between 1981 and 1984.
Imports were severely compressed and declined by
25 percent over the same period and had a severe
impact on economic activity. Manufacturing fell by








































































































Source: World Bank (2009e).
ODA PER CAPITA FOR TANZANIA 1960–2006
net ODA per capita in current US dollars
Figure 2
4 The conceptual and implementation weaknesses of the NESP are
analyzed in Stein (1992).Drawing on these reports and under additional
pressure from donors, the 1984/85 budget contin-
ued its movement toward the IMF position and
included import liberalization (allowing individuals
to import without questions of foreign exchange
sources), the removal of subsidies on sembe and
fertilizer, a currency devaluation of 26 percent, tax
increases and a freeze on civil service hiring,a stop-
ping of overdrafts on government accounts and the
introduction of school fees. In line with a 1984 Pre-
sidential Commission on Public Sector Reform, the
1985/86 budgets further reduced government
spending by announcing the layoff of 27,000 work-
ers in the civil service and the elimination of a num-
ber of parastatals.The budget also abolished export
taxes, reduced some customs duties and raised
interest rates.
By the 1986/87 budget time Tanzania had met most
of the conditions of the 1981 IMF memorandum and
was ready to satisfy their donors by reaching an
agreement with the IMF. In June 1986 donors
promised to end the period of declining support with
a significant increase in assistance if they settled with
the IMF and the World Bank. In August 1986, the
IMF signed a standby accord for SDR 64.2 million.
Shortly after the IMF accord, the government also
received a structural adjustment loan from the
World Bank.Following the accords,in October 1987,
Tanzania signed a three-year Structural Adjustment
Facility (SAF) with the IMF for SDR 54.5 million for
the first two years.The third year was contingent on
finalizing an agreement for an Extended Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) which was signed in
1989. The conditions were publicized in the govern-
ment’s three year Economic Recovery Program
(ERP) 1986–1989.
The 1989/90 budget was the first post-ERP I budget,
but provided a continuation of the liberalization
strategy. The shilling was devalued further (by
December 1989 it had fallen 480 percent), the export
retention scheme was expanded into new categories,
foreign exchange accounts were permitted for
Tanzanians working abroad, and school fees were
raised significantly. A second three-year program
(now called the Economic and Social Action
Program) was prepared for the donor’s consultative
group meeting in December 1989.It contained a con-
tinuation of the liberalization measures of the earlier
accord and reflected the conditionality of the ESAF.
It emphasized the same credit controls, producer
incentives, extension of user charges for government
services, maintenance of steady real exchange rates
through depreciations, etc. (Stein 1992).
Along with the IMF inducements,Tanzania was also
rewarded with a series of World Bank loans primar-
ily through the low interest window of the IDA. In
1986 they received a USD 300 million loan (half
from IDA and half from donors) aimed at increasing
agricultural production,particularly export crops via
devaluations, market improvements and improved
transport. A series of mostly macroeconomic condi-
tions were associated with each tranche. In De-
cember 1988,the Industrial Rehabilitation and Trade
Adjustment Credit was approved for USD 242 mil-
lion with USD 182 million coming from the IDA. It
focused on trade liberalization, tariff and sales tax
reforms and industrial restructuring in the area of
textiles, leather and agricultural processing.
In 1990, Tanzania received an Agricultural Ad-
justment Credit for USD 385 million, of which USD
200 million came from the IDA.It focused on the lib-
eralization of marketing of agricultural products and
inputs. The Financial Sector and Adjustment
Program of 1991 for USD 275 million from the IDA
focused on banking sector liberalization, including
privatization, allowing forex bureaus and permitting
foreign banks entry privileges into the Tanzania mar-
ket.Finally the Structural Adjustment Credit in 1991,
also for USD 200 million was aimed at parastatal
restructuring and privatization, civil service reform
and market restructuring for agricultural exports.The
first three IDA loans supported ERP I and the latter
three ERP II (Raikes and Gibbon 1996).
As promised,Tanzania was handsomely rewarded by
the donors. Overall, the multilateral agencies
increased ODA by 45 percent in 1986 and 23 percent
in 1987.Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
aid was even more generous and increased 38 per-
cent in 1986 and 40 percent in 1987. In US dollar
terms, the 1987 level was almost double the 1985
level. There was a big expansion in the category of
program aid in the overall bilateral statistics,which is
associated with the financial assistance linked to
structural adjustment policies. Program aid in-
creased almost fourfold from USD 68.2 million in
1985 to USD 221.3 million. Tanzania was rewarded
not only in the category of foreign aid but in virtual-
ly every area aid was allocated.The high level of sup-
port continued through the early 1990s, peaking in
1992 with net ODA hitting USD 1.3384 billion or
nearly a tripling of the 1985 level (OECD 2001).
CESifo Forum 4/2009 16
FocusCESifo Forum 4/2009 17
Focus
One can use a simple measurement of the reward for
settling with the IMF. If we assume that aid would
not have increased from the 1985 level, Tanzania
received a net inflow of an additional USD 3.7 bil-
lion from 1985 to 1992 alone. This is a massive
amount of foreign exchange for an economy that
exported only USD 300 to 400 million in the 1980s.
Other measures capture this increased intensity of
aid following the IMF accord. Aid per capita was
more than doubled from 1985 to the peak year of
1992 increasing from 21.8 to 49.3 US dollars per
capita. The latter figure was roughly 30 percent of
the per capita nominal GNP of 172 US dollars in
1992. Aid as a percentage of GDP increased from
7.4 percent in 1995 all the way to 28.6 percent in 1992
(OECD 2001).
In 1992 Tanzania lapsed in its vigilant commitment
to meeting conditionality. The World Bank (2001,
323) was puzzled by the movement away from the
trajectory of reform: “in 1992, President Mwinyi
appointed Malima as Minister of Finance.Although
the move is hard to explain politically, given
Malima’s background [he was a former Minister of
Planning and an important figure associated with
Nyerere’s socialist strategy], he seemed to change
his views on economic reform.This was the start of
a new period of crisis, however, and President
Mwinyi seemed less emphatic as a reformer during
his second term in office. Some argue that he lost
control”.
However, the early 1990s were also a period of con-
siderable turmoil with increasing popular criticism of
adjustment. In 1992 there were major upheavals in
two universities in response to cost sharing propos-
als associated with the conditionality of the World
Bank Higher Education Credit.In the Arusha region
small miners resisted the alienation of their rights
given to new companies under the new investment
regulations linked to reform and conditionality. The
press with its growing independence after 1991 also
played an increasing role in articulating criticisms
(Raikes and Gibbon 1996). Malima, as a member of
the old guard,was partly brought in to shift direction
in the wake of the growing disenchantment with
adjustment.
The shift away from the commitment to adjustment
played a clear role in the decline of aid to Tanzania.
Among other things, the government missed fiscal
and credit targets. By 1994, the IMF cancelled its
adjustment program and essentially pulled out. The
donors were also rather disturbed by the number of
politically connected individuals receiving tax
exemptions on import duties, declining efficiency in
tax collection, the existence of a number of tax-free
transit warehouses (e.g. Tanzania destined for Zan-
zibar and vice versa) where items did not make it to
their destination, and corruption around debt con-
version programs where private sector actors were
rewarded for increasing investment.
The donor response was quite vociferous. The
Nordic countries (except Denmark), which were the
most consistent long-term supporters of Tanzania,
cut off aid in November 1994.Overall,as indicated in
Table 1, per capita aid plummeted by 43 percent
between 1992 and 1996.The IMF and Nordic cutoffs
sent a shock through the government. Malima was
moved out of his position in the Ministry of Finance,
the number of bonded warehouses was reduced
from 177 to 65 by June 1995, and large amounts of
outstanding taxes were to be collected by the
donor’s consultative meeting of February 1995
(Raikes and Gibbon 1996).
After the election of November 1995 when CCM
retained power, Mkapa became president. With
the fall-off in aid, CCM made a choice that was
accommodating to the donors. He was a known
pro-reformer and quickly put into place a team
that would satisfy the adjustment conditionality.
The government formulated a shadow IMF pro-
gram between June and July 1996.It earned praise
by the donors and the IMF.The IMF then reward-
ed Tanzania with a three-year ESAF.The govern-
ment also signed a deal with the Paris Club in
January 1997 and was included in the HIPC ini-
tiative in April 2000 (World Bank 2001a). Once
again the government was rewarded with aid,
reversing the downward trend and moving mod-
erately upward contrary to patterns in other parts
of SSA.
Since then Tanzania has kept in good relations with
the IMF. It signed the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) agreements with the IMF
in April 2000 (completed in August 2003) and
August 2003 (finished in February 2007) and a one-
year External Shock Facility in May 2009 (IMF
2009). Tanzania also received many more World
Bank loans than Uganda and Kenya after 1996
(57 compared to 44 for Uganda and only 33 for
Kenya).The loans continue to push the same ortho-
dox agenda including government decentralizationof power and services (Local Government Support
Project 2004 and 2006; Health Sector Development
Project 2003), seven poverty reduction support
credits which government spending targets (2003 to
2009) and deregulation to improve agricultural pri-
vate sector investment (Agricultural Sector De-
velopment Project 2006) – see World Bank (2009b).
As seen in Table 1, Tanzania was also rewarded by
the donor community with aid jumping by more
than 50 percent by 2003 to levels last achieved in the
early 1990s.
The Tanzania policy agenda like that of so many
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa has been dri-
ven by external donors. The World Bank has been
hard pressed to come up with many examples of
genuine input from business or civil organizations.
In discussing the input arising from proposed
changes to the National Bank of Commerce, the
World Bank admitted, ‘what was deemed best for
Tanzania was the option that would make it easier
to attract aid’ (World Bank 2001a). Donors have
also coordinated their efforts to provide incentives
to Uganda to follow the conditionality of the World
Bank and the IMF.
Uganda
After the NRM had taken power in 1986, there was
widespread skepticism concerning markets and the
role of the private sector. Their initial attempt to
administer prices and exchange rates with little
donor support proved unworkable, as inflation
increased and economic activity continued to
decline.They had little choice but to turn to the IFIs
and little technical or financial strength to resist any
parts of the standard package.
Beginning in May 1987, Uganda launched the
Economic Recovery Program (ERP).The initial pro-
gram involved a 77 percent devaluation (43 percent
in real terms), an increase in all export crop prices,
budgetary discipline, which improved through shift-
ing access to bank credit for the private sector and
paratastals rather than directly from the coffers of
the government,foreign exchange controls that were
to be replaced by an OGL (open general licensing)
system, price control reductions and privatization of
parastatals including the liberalization of the crop
marketing system. In 1987 Uganda was rewarded
with an IMF facility of SDR 69.7 million and with an
Extended Structural Adjustment Facility of SDR 219
million in 1989. In the same year the World Bank
allocated its first Economic Recovery Credit (and a
second one in 1991) which included USD 132 million
from the IDA and USD 132 million from other
donors mobilized by the IDA (Brett 1986).
The response was very generous. While DAC aid
went up moderately after the NRM victory (net
inflow rose by USD 35million in 1986) the large
inflow of DAC bilateral program aid did not occur
until after Uganda settled with the IMF. In 1990 the
DAC aid increased by nearly 600 percent compared
to the 1985 level. Overall nominal net inflow of
ODA had gone from USD 192.3 million in 1986 to
USD 668 million in 1990 or more than tripling of the
level. As in Tanzania, bilateral program aid jumped
enormously and increased more than eleven-fold
between 1985 and 1988. However, the increase was
not limited to structural adjustment loans but was
virtually across the board. Aid
intensity, as measured by aid per
capita, had increased from
USD 12.3 to USD 38.5 by 1992
(OECD 2001). The aid inflow
was all the more remarkable
given the level of exports (USD
312 million in 1990) – see World
Bank (2000). Aid inflows be-
came virtually the only source of
foreign exchange for private
imports under official arrange-
ments. Foreign exchange was
vital to the government budgets.
After conversion, it covered
roughly half of the government
recurrent budget by 1990. Once









































































































Source: World Bank (2009e).
ODA PER CAPITA FOR UGANDA 1960–2006
net ODA per capita in current US dollars
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program aid was put in place, donors covered virtu-
ally all new projects – on average 80 percent of the
total developmental budget (World Bank 2001a).
Despite missing some of the more narrow technical
targets of the World Bank and the IMF, there was
continuity of support through the early 1990s. By
1994 Uganda had received two Economic Recovery
Credits, a Structural Adjustment Credit, a Financial
Sector Adjustment Credit, Agricultural Sector
Adjustment Credit and several other investment
credits, two Structural Adjustment Facility Loans
and four annual arrangements under the Extended
Structural Adjustment Facility. Between 1987 and
1992 the original policy conditionality was deepened
with continuous pressure to bring the exchange rate
in line with the parallel market rate, to reduce infla-
tion with budget deficit reductions, to eliminate
export crop monopolies, encouraging foreign and
domestic private investment through the reduction
in licensing controls and restoring property rights, to
privatize parastatals and to improve civil service effi-
ciency through retrenchment and other means. Aid
flows continued without interruption, with regular
donor meetings in Paris and Kampala, despite the
failure to implement many parts of the conditionali-
ty on schedule.
In some cases, such as the 1988/89 stabilization com-
ponents of the ERP, the World Bank admitted that
the government virtually abandoned all attempts to
reach the agreed targets (Brett 1996). In a 1993
report, the World Bank stated that government own-
ership was weak and limited to a narrow circle of
ministers and senior officials.There was not sufficient
effort to foster wide support for the program (World
Bank 1993).However,it continued to lend because it
had a strong vested interest in achieving success.
Brett (1996) argues that the donors continued
because so much was done on the security front,
restoring essential services and implementing disci-
pline and because the regime was willing to deal with
failures and work toward a new regiment. However,
this also ignores the importance of Museveni as a
strong ally of the United States in the region and the
belief in the United States and IFIs that structural
adjustment was in dire need of a ‘success’ case.
Although Ghana was cited as the best of example of
successful adjustment up to the early 1990s, Uganda
replaced it in this role thereafter.5 In other words,
Uganda’s slippage was tolerated whereas there was
less flexibility in dealing with Tanzania and Kenya.
Unlike Tanzania, Uganda continued to receive
strong aid support throughout the 1990s.After 1994
it obtained two additional World Bank Structural
Adjustment Credits, one for USD 80 million from
1994 to 1996 and another for USD 125 million from
1997 to 1999. It also obtained an Education Sector
Adjustment Credit for USD 80 million. The IMF
also continued its uninterrupted support with three-
year ESAFs for USD 180 million in 1994 and USD
138 million in 1997, a three-year PRGF in Sep-
tember 2002 for SDR 13.5 million that was extend-
ed until January 2006 (World Bank 2001a). Uganda
also received 44 loans and credits between April
1996 and March 2009 from the World Bank includ-
ing seven Poverty Reduction Support Credits for
USD 150 to 200 million (between July 2001 and May
2008) – see World Bank (2009). Many focused on
the usual orthodox agenda including privatization
(Privatization and Utility Sector Reform 2000),
decentralization (Local Government Develop-
ment/Local Government Management 1999, 2003
and 2008) and financial liberalization (Financial
Sector Market Assistants Project 1999) (World
Bank 2009c).
One of the downsides of the strong support by the
IFIs is the disproportionately high loan component
of Uganda’s ODA.Multilateral aid exceeded bilater-
al aid in all but two years between 1986 and 1994.
With the exception of 1998 and 1999, loans have 
typically been in the 30 to 50 percent range of the
total net ODA inflows since 1987 (OECD 2001).The
result is that Uganda experienced one of the most
rapid increases of debt of any country in the world,
rising by 571 percent between 1980 and 1998.6 Given
the structural weaknesses of exports and their heavy
reliance on cash crops like coffee, the debt/export
ratio rose from 209 percent to 1,555 percent before
moderating slightly in the latter 1990s (World Bank
2009c).
5Although Ghana was the No.1 ‘success case’ in the ‘adjustment in
Africa’ (World Bank 1994), it was no longer praised by the World
Bank, shortly thereafter. In February 1997, for example, in a meet-
ing at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on Adjustment
in Africa which I attended, there was no mention of adjustment in
Ghana by the chief economist for Africa at the time (Kevin
Cleaver).Uganda was placed at the top of new list of success cases.
In 2001,in a glossy publication entitled A Case for Aid, Uganda was
only one of two countries in SSA highlighted as a success case as an
example of a ‘Successful Poverty Focused Adjustment Program’
(World Bank 2001b). Just as the World Bank was boasting of this
decline in poverty rates,GNI per capita fell by an average of 4 per-
cent per year between 1999 and 2003.Poverty levels rose to 39 per-
cent of the population in 2002 from 34 percent in 1999 (World Bank
2009a).
6 By contrast,Tanzania has often had two to three times the level of
bilateral assistance relative to multilateral assistance and grants
have generally been more than 80 percent of the total in most years
after 1986. While Tanzania has high overall debt, the growth since
1980 was much slower rising by only 34 percent between 1980 and
1997 (World Bank 2000).Because of its high level of
debt and ‘good behavior’,
Uganda was the first country to
be declared eligible under the
HIPC initiative (April 1997).
One year later it received relief
of USD 650 million from its
external creditors which was
approximately 17.5 percent of
total 1997 external debt. Bi-
lateral donors in the Paris Club
also agreed to debt reschedul-
ing in Uganda on six occasions
between 1980 and 1999. Ugan-
da was the first country to re-
ceive debt rescheduling under
the Naples terms, correspond-
ing to a reduction in eligible debt of 67 percent in
net present value terms. Donor debt relief dis-
bursements rose from USD 12.9 million in 1991/92
to USD 53.31 million in 1996/97. Before the HIPC
initiative, Uganda also received some multilateral
debt relief from the bilateral donor’s Multilateral
Debt Fund.
Uganda was also the first country to reach the com-
pletion point for the Enhanced HIPC and obtained
additional relief of USD 1.3 billion in May 2000. In
July 2005 Uganda, along with eighteen other poor
countries that reached the completion point, was
provided an even larger reward for good behavior
with a USD 3.522 billion write-off under the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (World Bank
2009g). By 2006, due to debt relief efforts, Uganda’s
debt/export ratio fell to a very moderate 53 percent
with total debt declining by nearly 75 percent from
its peak (World Bank 2009a).
While new initiatives for debt reduction were put in
place,overall aid to Uganda began to slow,reflecting
donor fatigue. The 1998 and 1999 overall levels fell
by 43 percent and 29 percent respectively with de-
clines in both DAC bilateral and multilateral assis-
tance (OECD 2001).However,Uganda followed the
post-MDG surge with a nearly doubling of aid
between 2002 and 2006 to levels well above the SSA
average.
Kenya
While Tanzania and Uganda have largely complied
with adjustment conditionality, Kenya has had a
much more problematic relationship with the IFIs
and the donors. Kenya was one of the first countries
in Africa to receive a World Bank Structural Adjust-
ment Loan in March 1980,focusing on reducing gov-
ernment deficit spending, re-orientation of industry
toward exports and interest-rate reform. The IMF
followed up with a standby agreement in October
1980 pushing similar conditionality including trade
liberalization.However,the stop-and-go relationship
started almost from the beginning. The IMF agree-
ment quickly broke down, and another one was
signed in January 1982,with even tougher conditions
for government borrowing and an associated large
cutback in the government deficit.This one was also
suspended for a failure to reduce government bor-
rowing from the central bank. The allocation of the
second tranche of the 1982 Structural Adjustment
Loan was delayed until 1984. Kenya in the end did
not undertake all the conditionality but was still
granted the tranche. Partly as a result, a new Struc-
tural Adjustment Loan was not issued until 1986
which led to a rise in donor assistance. However,
relationship with the IMF slightly improved after a
standby agreement was successfully completed in
December 1982 (Ikiara and Ndung’u 1999).
In 1986,Kenya confirmed its commitment to reform
in the Sessional Paper No. 1, ‘Economic Manage-
ment for Renewed Growth’.The paper was a prod-
uct of extensive dialogue between the IMF, the
World Bank and the Kenyan government through-
out 1985. The World Bank and the IMF supported
the commitments in the paper with a series of loans.
Between 1986 and 1989 the IMF approved a Com-
pensatory Facility, a Standby Agreement, an SAF
and an Enhanced SAF for a total exceeding SDR
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480 million.The World Bank was even more gener-
ous with the approval of six Sectoral Adjustment
Loans (SECALs) totaling USD 537 million between
1986 and 1991. An additional USD 348 million was
allocated as IDA reflows or credits to offset previ-
ous IDA loans (World Bank 2001a). Annual dis-
bursements of net ODA from multilateral sources
increased eightfold between 1986 and 1990 (to
USD 446.1 million). Bilateral donors also respond-
ed generously. The DAC group, following the IFIs,
nearly doubled their net ODA to USD 735.2 mil-
lion. The aid intensity figures support the quantita-
tive jump in ODA.Aid per capita reached a histori-
cal peak hitting USD 48.7 in nominal dollar terms
and 13.2 percent of GDP, up from USD 21.3 and
6.5 percent in 1986. As seen in Figure 3, after the
peak, aid rapidly trended downwards as relations
between the donors and Kenya deteriorated. By
1999 nominal per capita aid had fallen to less than
half of the 1986 level (USD 10.5) and a mere 3 per-
cent of GDP (OECD 2001).
The same problematic relations were repeated again
in the early 1990s and after 1996 with greater conse-
quences to aid disruption (World Bank 2001). The
difference was less a change in Kenya’s behavior or
less tolerance by the donors.Kenya was less strategi-
cally important in the post-cold war period; other
countries had proven that it was possible to meet the
conditionality (Ndulu and Mwega 1994).By Novem-
ber 1991 donor frustration had been building over
the lagging commitment to adjustment targets, cor-
ruption and governance issues surrounding Moi’s
long-term control of the presidency and his resis-
tance to multi-party elections.Aid was suspended at
the Consultative Group meeting in November 1991.
The freeze lasted until mid-1993 and affected more
than USD 400 million in potential financial support
including undrawn funds from the IMF ESAF, the
World Bank SECALs in agriculture,export develop-
ment and education, the ADB funds, and significant
amounts from Japan, the EU (and its members like
Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, etc.) and the
United States. Under pressure, the government re-
newed its effort for reform and eventually received
about half the sums. They also signed on a new
ESAF for SDR 150 million in April 1996 and
received a new Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC)
with IDA reflows of USD 90 million and USD 35
million, respectively. In mid-1997 the ESAF was sus-
pended by the IMF for non-compliance on condi-
tionality with only SDR 25 million allocated. It was
allowed to expire in 1999. For similar reasons, the
SAC second tranche was cancelled in mid-1998
(World Bank 2001). Bilateral assistance was also
largely cut off. In 1999 total ODA net flows were
merely 25 percent of the peak of 1990 in nominal
terms (OECD 2001).
After Kenya had set up an anti-corruption commis-
sion in 1999 and had curtailed government spending,
it was rewarded by an IMF PRGF and a World Bank
Economic and Public Sector Reform Credit in 2000.
However, the anti-corruption commission was
declared unconstitutional in December 2000 with
programs suspended. In 2003 Kenya held a success-
ful consultative meeting and a new three-year PRGF
was signed in November of that year.Aid per capita
had more than doubled by 2006 to USD 26 but was
well below the levels of Tanzania and Uganda and
only 50 percent or so of its peak year of 1990. Over-
all, the IMF had fourteen programs with Kenya, far
more than Uganda and Tanzania, but only five were
fully disbursed. Another five had disbursal rates
between 0 and 28 percent (Conway 2007).
Kenya had a much smaller number of World Bank
loans between June 1996 and April 2009 (around
30) compared to Uganda and Tanzania. However,
the focal point was also on the orthodox agenda in-
cluding civil service reform and privatization
(Structural Adjustment Credit 1996), decentraliza-
tion of government services (Decentralized Repro-
ductive Health Project 2000) and a reduction of
non-tariff barriers (East Africa Trade and Transport
Facilitation Project 2006), as shown in World Bank
(2009d).
Overall, despite the problematic relations with
donors, Ikiara and Ndung’u (1999) argue that by the
end of 1995 Kenya had implemented major political
and economic reforms agreed upon with the multi-
lateral and bilateral donors. The economic reforms
implemented included the removal of virtually all
price and foreign exchange controls, the liberaliza-
tion of domestic marketing trade, import liberaliza-
tion, reduction of the budget deficit, financial
reform, privatization, removal of wage guidelines
and other labor market reforms and liberalization of
the exchange rate.
Conclusions
The poor performance of the Kenyan economy and
the inability to reach many targets is a product of a
complex confluence of events. The machinations ofKenyan politics have not contributed to growth and
stability. However, neither has adjustment with its
onerous conditionality and policies that are often
based on economic theory with little grasp of the
realities of African economies and the developmen-
tal needs of the continent.7 Even with its stop-and-
go relationship with the Bretton Woods Institutions
and donors Kenyan policies have followed the same
course of economic reform. Despite the variations
in the histories of the three African countries,
donors have largely acted as a cartel using aid as a
weapon to impose a singular vision of transforma-
tion broadly defined. In 1981 roughly 27.5 million
people lived in poverty in these three African coun-
tries. In 2005, the numbers had nearly doubled to
53.2 million or more than 50 percent of population.
Hence there has been no improvement after nearly
three decades of imposed policies (World Bank
2009f). This remains the historical legacy of donor
aid in East Africa.
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